V.—PESSIMISM by Plumacher, O.
68 Pessimism.
established the empire and the peace of Borne, and created the
civilised world.
NOTE.—I may add a word here abont editions and translations of Marcus
Aurelins. No author wants a wmmentarymore, but Marcus Aurelius has
been strangely neglected in this respect There is, I believe, no annotated
edition later than Gataker's, which dates from the middle of the seven-
teenth century. The text is often difficult, or corrupt, or both; the
condition of some places is probably hopeless. Besides other scholars,
Corais and Suhnltz have done good work upon it, but much yet remains to
do. The Tauchnits reprint ot Schultz's text (which is practically the only
available edition for ordinary purposes) has critical notes, but the absence
of all discriminating marks in the text itself is a drawback. For English
readers the want of a commentary is, to a considerable extent, supplied by
Mr. Long's excellent translation ; not altogether, for I think, with all
deference to the taste of a master in criticism, that the Greek has, if not
exactly a charm, yet enough of a " distinct physiognomy " to keep one
from leaving it on the shelf. One can only regret that Mr. Long's notes
are so few and brief A new French translation' has been published
by M. Barthelemy St. Hilaire (Paris, 1876). The version is more finished
in style than Mr. Long's, but often at the cost of exactness. Corrupt
passages are slurred over, for instance, in a way quite inadmissible accord-
ing to English notions of scholarship, by guesses at the general sense which
do not stand for any particular reading. There is a running commentary,
which does not attempt any specific tracing of the various Stoic doctrines,
and does attempt, with very indifferent success, to find in M. Aurelius the
tone and arguments of a modern French philosopher of the mritvalittt
school. The notes, in fact, are rather homiletdc than eiegetic The object
appears to be simply to reproduce the book in a form suited for modem use
as an aid to moral reflection.
FBEDERICK POLLOCK.
V.—PESSIMISM.
IN offering the following remarks on Pessimism, my object is
not to advance any new arguments in its support, but only to
review that critical survey of the doctrine which has recently
been made by an English writer. Pessimism, as is well known,
has of late been gaining ground both in Germany and elsewhere,
and in view of this fact Mr. James Sully has presented us with
an examination of the doctrine in a work entitled Pessimism :
A History and a Criticism. Three pointa in particular have
been dwelt upon by him : first, the systematic proof which the
doctrine has found in the works of Schopenhauer and Hartmann;
Becondly, its chance of realisation in the present and future;
and lastly, the conditions of its genesis in the individual mind,
and the causes of its rapid propagation. Mr. Sully especially
attacks the Philosophic des Unbewussttn of E. von Hartmann. As
this work has not yet been translated into English, it is hardly
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Pessimism. 69
possible for English readers to estimate the justice of the charges
that Mr. Sully has brought against i t ; and hence they may not
be unwilling to listen to a voice out of the pessimistic camp
raised in defence of its leader.
To the unreflective mind in the juvenile age of individuals as
well as of the race, life in itself is no problem: it is a self-
evident thing—that which must be, and cannot help being.
But when pain, sickness, hunger, death appear, then come
doubts and questionings, stirring that feeling of wonder which is
destined to become the mother of philosophy. Thus does
meditation on the misery of life beget philosophy, while at the
same time it prompts the desire to vanquish that misery, as a
thing which ought not to be.
Mr. Sully in the first four chapters of his work gives an
account of the struggles between pessimism and optimism,
which will interest many readers. As we approach the present
time, we find the voices of unreasoned pessimism swelling in
number, while philosophic pessimism recedes more and more into
the background. Schopenhauer first fully recognised the claim
of pessimism to be regarded as an integral part of the system
of philosophy; Mr. Sully, accordingly, next expounds his system.
In relation to pessimism Dr. Hartmann1 may be considered
the successor of Schopenhauer, but in respect of the principles of
his system he can no more be called the successor of Schopen-
hauer than of HegeL All that can be said is, that as every
vital system of philosophy must assimilate the main ideas of ita
predecessor, so Hartmann's is a higher synthesis of Schopen-
hauer's ' alogical' will and Hegel's logical idea as attributes of
the unconscious spirit I t is an error in Mr. Sully to class
Hartmann with Bahnsen and Frauenstadt as disciples of
Schopenhauer *; while he obscures the metaphysical and psycho-
logical proof of pessimism by constantly miring up the doctrines
of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, the part played by Will in the
systems of the two being entirely different
Mr. Sully next gives a short biographical sketch of Hartmann,
with a brief analysis of the Philosophy of the Unconscious. In
composing this work Hartmann addressed himself less to the
limited eircle of professional philosophers, than to the large body
of readers, happily still to be found in the " land of thinkers and
poets," who are interested in philosophical questions. Partly
on this account, and partly as a consequence of the inductive
method employed, we find explanations given in the first and
1
 Hartmann is Doctor honorit eautd of the University of Rostock.
* It is also an error to call A. Taubert a disciple of Schopenhauer. Tau-
bert's view of the world is based entirely npon Hartmann's philosophy.
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70 Pessimism.
second parts of the work which either have a merely pro-
paedeutical value or which, .though well fitted to elucidate the
successive steps of the induction, are seen from the higher levels
afterwards reached to be self-evident, not to say, tautological.
Now, Mr. Sully, in examining the work, points out first these
passages which are generally unimportant; and, instead of indi-
cating the fundamental principles of the system and the conse-
quences drawn from them (the only way to give in a few pages
a sufficiently clear exposition of a philosophical system), he
follows the successive steps of the induction, sometimes crowding
the contents of a whole chapter into a single sentence. The
result is, to give the reader not only an inadequate, but a
decidedly distorted view of Hartmann's great book.
Here the historical part of Mr. Bully's work ends. In Chapter
VII. he begins the criticism of the metaphysical proof of pes-
simism. Like Hartmann—though from a very different motive
—he designates the problem of pessimism a eudaemonistic or
hedonistic one. As the ethical worth of the world is of account
only as it influences the feelings, he shows that hedonism is the
only principle whereby we can try the solution of the pessimistic
question. Would the non-existence of the world be preferable
to its existence? Pessimism, according to Schopenhauer and
Hartmann, follows d priori from the nature of Will, as the
principle of life. Every act of will refers to something which
does not yet exist, else it would not be necessary to will it}
and as long as the volition does not procure its satisfaction,
there is a state of longing, restlessness. All these terms are of
course but similes when the satisfaction of will is an unconsci-
ous representation. If a volition can become satisfied, it must
be at the cost of another volition, which is proportionately
repressed in ite sphere of action. In the region of conscious
life, whether the aim of will be the mere maintenance of
life, or the realisation of an idea, it is at all times and at all
points in collision with other volitions, tending in opposite
directions, and those that give way in the struggle react as pain.
Schopenhauer was content to deduce the misery of life d
priori from the principle; but Hartmann, proceeding inductively,
offers an d posteriori proof. Nevertheless, he also has his d
priori treatment, and thus, when Mr. Sully attempts to under-
mine the metaphysical and psychological bases of German pes-
simism, he has to deal with the metaphysics of both philo-
sophers. Metaphysical systems, in Mr. Bully's eyes, are mere
outgrowths of poetical fancy, without any claim to a relatively
objective truth. He grounds this opinion on the fact that new
systems are continually springing up ; but he does not see that
there is something common to all, which is ever developing and
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growing in breadth and depth. Acknowledging no objective
spirit, he does not understand how philosophy is the develop-
ment of the self-consciousness of the Absolute in the multitude
of individual minds. The impulse, rooted in the deepest ground
of our nature, to inquire after the cautae eausarum, to advance
from the phenomenon to the noiimenon—this most lofty-of the
impulses common to men—is to Mr. Sully a weakness, and in his
optimism he hopes that a time will come when it shall be con-
quered (p. 153), and men will be satisfied with the knowledge
sumcient for the practical relations of phenomena.to each other.
But as long as this impulse, which Schopenhauer calls the
" metaphysical want," exists in most men, Mr. Sully holds it to
be the prime task of philosophy to show that it has no right to
exist, since all that we can know is that a gulf yawns between
our empirical world (of subjective representations) and its trans-
cendental essence. Now against a dogmatism which lays
claim to the possession of absolute truth, it is clearly open to
object on the ground of subjective idealism. Accordingly, when
Schopenhauer, notwithstanding his idealism, asserts that we are
immediately conscious of our will, Mr. Sully does well to point
out that we do not know our will otherwise than as a repre-
sentation—as an object, like our Ego, among other objects.
Hartmann, howewr, in his philosophy is no dogmatist; on
the contrary, he ever seeks to combat dogmatism. The critical
ground he takes up is indicated in his work New-Kantianism,
Schopenkauerianism and Hcgeliantsm, while his position re-
lative to the different theories of knowledge, especially to
Kant's subjective idealism, is shown in his Foundation of
Transcendental Bealism (1875), and in a criticism of Von
Kirchmann's Theory of Perception (1875). We are willing to
suppose that Mr. Sully did not know of these works when he
wrote the airy sentences on p. 454.
From the point of view of subjective idealism metaphysic is
an impossibility. If time, space, causation, relation, exis-
tence, &o, have as forms of the mind an exclusively sub-
jective signification, without being forms of the Ding-an-sich,
then of course we neither have the right to construct a world by
deduction from an a priori principle, nor can we hope to reach
one by induction. But if subjective idealism is right, and
metaphyBic an impossibility, then, since all we think is but our
thought, natural science, as it is generally understood, is also
impossible as science. For as it is the science of the real, inde-
pendent of the subjective, and has nothing but our representa-
tions for ite objects, natural science can only be the science of
human modes of thinking and representing. Nay, even such a
science becomes questionable, if we follow out subjective idealism
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to its logical conclusion in solipsism and illusionism. If I have
the right to suppose a subject—my Ego—behind my represen-
tations ; if I further have the right to suppose the existence of
other subjects, independent of my representations, but analog-
ous to my own subject,—then I also have the right to suppose
thing8-in-themselves behind my representations, as their causal
conditions. Let it be observed, I only say, If 1 have the right to
use Kant's categories transcendentally. Should I assert this
right as self-evident, I fall into the dogmatism of naive realism
(as the older materialism does); should I deny it, I sink into the
hopeless abyss of illusionism, or into scepticism, which is also a
negative dogmatism. If, on the contrary, I am convinced that
my nature is not a mere colossal humbug, whose very existence
I can rightly neither affirm nor deny, but corresponds to an
objective truth, if by the very constitution of my mind I am
forced to suppose things-in-themselves behind my representations
as their causes, then I stand on the ground of transcendental
realism, a doctrine which modern natural science, more or less
consciously, accepts. Mr. Sully never tells us what his own
theory of knowledge is. Will he doom metaphysics because its
constructions are founded on mental representations ? Then the
doom must equally fall upon science also, since we never can
travel outside our perception and thoughts, outside our- senses.
On p. 170, Mr. Sully says, " our minds have received their
structure in connexion with this very order of things, which is
to be accounted for; consequently, all ontological deduction of
the world has to be carried out t>y help of conceptions drawn
from this very world itself." This, however, is far from being a
proof that mind cannot acquire any real knowledge; the
essential identity of the subject with the object to be known is
the very condition of the possibility of knowledge—and the
conditions of the possibility of knowledge form the first
principles of all the modern systems of metaphysic.
Having pointed out the worthlessness of metaphysic in general,
Mr. Sully might have saved himself the trouble of criticising
in particular the metaphysical doctrines of Schopenhauer and
Hartmann. It is easy to show the contradictions in Schopen-
hauer's system, yet, besides the error above mentioned, Mr.
Sully refers only to his obscure scheme of Platonic ideas. He
does not mention Schopenhauer's greatest mistake of all—the
attempt to combine materialism with subjective idealism by
declaring the intellect to be the product of matter, and matter
itself with the entire empirical world to be the product of
intellect
Passing next to Hartmann, Mr. Sully finds everywhere can-
tradictions and fallacies, which are mainly due to Las own mis-
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understanding. Whenever Hartmann makes use of a simile to
illustrate a difficult conception, he at once lays hold of it as an
opportunity of reproaching him for his "mythological fancies" and
" anthropomorphism". When Hartmann, starting from the con-
ception of the world as a process of evolution, and from the
relation of the logical idea to the ' alogical' will arrives at a
negative conclusion, namely, the cessation of volition, the end of
the world's existence, the reduction of actual being to potential
being; and when further, after carefully explaining that he by
no means thinks of predicting what will actually happen, he tries
to show how an end of the world-process might be conceived,—
Mr. Sully takes it all as a positive statement, and ridicules him
accordingly.
The two chapters in which Mr. Sully undertakes to undermine
the scientific basis of pessimism, after having, as he believes,
overthrown metaphysic in general and the doctrines of Schopen-
hauer and Hartmann in particular, present a jumble of sophism
and prejudice, which it would need a whole treatise to unravel.
We can here only briefly refer to his way .of demolishing
the well-compacted system of the Monism of Will He seems
to believe that a thing or an action has but to be denominated
differently to cease to be what it was. According to
Schopenhauer and Hartmann, all force ia will; the atom is a
single act of wilL Mr. Sully admits that " if force were proved
to be a reality in the physical world, we should, by the very
limitation of our minds, be compelled to think of it in terms of
our volitions " ; but force is " in science proper nothing but a
serviceable fiction"} If now, according to Mr. Sully, science
does not know force, what then is the ultimate and fundamental
phenomenon, of which the whole empirical world is the product ?
Motien, he replies. But motion can only be understood as the
function of a subject. Even supposing it could be empirically
shown that the elementary qualities, heat, light, &c, are caused
by motion, we should still have to face the questions : Whence
these motions ? What is their cause, and what are they ?
The conception of motion does not dispense with the con-
ception of force; there would be no motion if there were no
force. Force, whether we call it so, or call it will, is a
metaphysical conception, which seems to natural science a
somewhat shadowy thing, that might well be excluded from its
sphere. And physics is indeed justified in banishing force from
its territory; but the attempt to blot it out of existence is an
inroad into a higher sphere, which it is necessary to repeL Mr.
1
 Force aa an entity ia a fiction, but force aa a phenomenon is thoroughly
real, and to Hartmann the act of will ia simply phenomenal.
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Sully acknowledges no force and hence no will, only conscious
volition; but volition, as defined by him, is not genuine will, no
real volition. I t is only a perception of wili, accompanying a
mechanical action. This is plainly enough stated on p. 202:
" The great doctrine of the conservation of energy, carried out to
ite logical results, has led to the theory of animal and human
automatism, namely, that all the actions of our bodily organs,
voluntary as well as involuntary, are fully explained as the
results of mechanical processes." What stamps certain me-
chanical actions of the human organism as acts of volition,
different from mere " spontaneous movements" (not a happy
expression for a believer in automatism to employ) and from
" instinctive impulses," is simply a conscious perception (1) of
its motive, (2) of the aim of the movement, (3) of the character
of the action, either as an immediate means to the object in view,
or as a linV in a chain of means to that object To be consistent,
Mr. Sully should declare volition also to be only a useful fiction,
unless he is prepared to acknowledge all bodily functions to be
acts of will (volition proper). But this is what he cannot do,
for, as he truly says, there is no volition without a representation,
and he will not admit unconscious representation. Consciousness
and perception are synonymous to him; while he tries at length
to persuade us that there are no unconscious perceptione, with the
effect, however, only of showing us that consciousness is not
unconscious, and that he has misunderstood Hartmann's concep-
tion of unconscious representation as the ideal form of real
existence.
He even denies the relatively unconscious, that is to say, the
consciousness of the different nervous centres within an organism,
which is asserted by Hartmann in the same sense as by
Helmholtz, Maudsley, Lewes, and other men of science. I t
would perhaps be more consistent to go back at once to
Descartes, and deny consciousness altogether to the lower
animals ; for not possessing self-consciousness, they cannot tell
us of their consciousness.
Hartmann's view of consciousness as springing from the
conflict of will seems to Mr. Sully fallacious, but he himself
avoids fallacy only by taking the easy course of having no theory
of ite genesis, and so saving himself the trouble of explaining
how a purely spiritual moment, like a conscious representation,
;an set in motion the bodily mechanism. Without such
explanation, it is idle to tell us that the pessimist falls into
l.he blunder of supposing that will is the parent, instead
of the natural and necessary foe, of life's misery, inasmuch
us it partly crushes, partly satisfies, desire and longing and
other unpleasant feelings, at the same time that it directly
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aims at the attainment of pleasure. Just as if pessimists
ever doubted that the will makes for pleasure and avoids
pain! If each act of will could extort its own satisfaction,
the worid would be a paradise, and there would be no pessimists.
But it is just this satisfaction that is difficult of attainment in a
worid of conflicting acts of will
We come now to Pleasure and Pain. According to Hartmann,
Sensation is a special mode of consciousness. Pleasure and
pain, on the physical side, are intensified forms of the specific
affections of the different organs; on the mental side, they are
intensified reactions of will upon representations. Unsatisfied
will is pain, whether the accompanying representation is consci-
ous or (as in the case of many uncertain and indefinite feelings)
unconscious. But unconsciously satisfied will yields no pleasure;
it is only when the consciousness is sufficiently established to
allow of representations and sensations being compared with each
other, that the satisfaction of will becomes known as pleasure,
as a higher feeling than mere painleasness, which is the normal
state. By this conception of pleasure and pain, Hartmann's
doctrine that the difference between the two is merely
quantitative, not qualitative, loses much of ite apparently
paradoxical character. On this point Mr. Sully has unpardon-
ably misunderstood Hartmann. He says, p. 120: " Hartmann's
account of the manifestations of the Unconscious in pleasure
and pain is extremely curious. Pleasures and pains are perfectly
homogeneous states, differing in quantity only !" But Hart-
mann says no such thing. What he really says is, that
pleasure and pain as such, i.e., apart from their causes and
contention, show, each within Us own sphere, merely quantita-
tive, not qualitative, differences.
To understand what pleasure and pain really are, Mr. Sully
refers us to " any respectable text-book in psychology'.
" Pleasure and pain are found to arise from certain modes of
bodily and mental activity, which are variously defined as those
which promote or hinder function." This, however, is an ex-
planation which is only applicable if matter and mind are con-
ceived as one identical substance. From the standpoint of a
vague dualistic automatism (pp. 177 and 465), pleasure and pain
can be nothing but the signs of approbation and disap-
probation on the part of the concrete mind, when the
latter, in some mysterious way (heaven knows how!), perceives
that its seeing, hearing, speaking, and walking machine is
working smoothly, or the reverse. We are far from denying,
and Hartmann himself admits, that pleasure often does accom-
pany the promotion, and pain the hindrance, of organic function,
but promotion and hindrance are not at all times causes of
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these feelings. Pleasure may just as well be the cause as the
consequent of physical well-being; and if pajn is often the
offspring of bodily disturbances, it is just as often their parent.
Moreover, how is this doctrine to account for the fact that
pleasure of a high degree can co-exist with conditions that are
destroying health and life ? If in this case the pleasure does
not arise from the satisfaction of a higher will than is in the
cells or organs, it is altogether inexplicable. Again, even on
Mr. Sully's own supposition, we can establish an evident excess
of pain, the very thing that he disputes. The organism is at all
times and from all sides exposed to dangerous influences, both
natural and artificial, which hinder and destroy its well-being,
and may even depress it for long periods to a state little above
death. The influences that promote physical well-being, on the
other hand, have to be looked out for and provided, and after
all can do no more than raise life to its normal state. This
normal state (which is paralleled, in the case of species, by
adaptation to natural conditions in the struggle for existence)
is the least we can get on with, and it is only our familiarity
with pain that makes it appear as positively pleasurabla Every
attempt to raise the state of well-being beyond the normal point
leads again Co pain, though perhaps in another sphere, as when
certain spiritual pleasures disorder the bodily energy or vice
versd.
If Mr. Sully thus far, in controverting the pessimistic theory,
advances nothing in support of optimism, he is no more suc-
cessful in his strictures upon Hartmann's arguments for the pre-
ponderance of pain. Hartmann maintains, (1) that through
irritation and exhaustion of the nerves pain becomes more and
more painful the longer it lasts, while positive pleasure in the
like case is lessened and, prompting the will to seek relief,
gives rise to a new pain if relief is not found; (2) that satis-
faction of will is recognised as pleasure only where the indivi-
dual mind is advanced enough to compare the different states
of sensation, while the mere fact of unsatisfied will is consciously
felt; (3) that the relief which follows a pain constitutes the
highest degree of pleasure; (4) that the pleasure of satis-
faction is only a fleeting one, while the pain of non-satisfaction
lasts as long as the effort of volition. Mr. Sully stoves
to show that the pleasure that follows relief from pain is
a real pleasure, and not mere painlessness. This Hartmann
does not doubt, but lie holds that, in any general estimate
of the value of life according to the balance of pains or
pleasures, the whole amount of such pleasure is not only not
sufficient to outweigh pain, but is not even enough to redress
the scala Were there no pain in the world, there would not be
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any of this negative pleasure; but that it would be a good bargain
to get rid of all positive pain at the cost of all such pleasure,
•will be doubted only by those who would assert that poverty is
desirable in order that the rich may enjoy the pleasure of alms-
giving. With regard to the first of Hartmann's arguments for
the preponderance of pain, Mr. Sully admits the fact, but finds
in it an argument against pessimism, since the insensibility pro-
duced by nervous exhaustion destroys the pain and diminishes
the discontent at the absence of pleasure. Now it is true that
there is a certain degree of pain at which insensibility sets in.
But terrible suffering must be endured before the nerves are
paralysed, while as the field of irritation spreads and new parts
are affected, though the first may have become insensible, those
last attacked are but just beginning to torment After all,
too, this painless exhaustion yields but a short respite : as soon
as the nerve has recovered its energy, suffering begins again;
or if the complete destruction of certain nerves, or of whole
organs, does really bring permanent relief, then it is attended
with peril to the existence of the individual Physicians do not
regard the cessation of pain as a favourable symptom as long as
the source of the irritation remains or has become intensified.
In Hartmann's view, although it is hardly possible to deter-
mine the equivalence of a certain quantity of pleasure to a certain
quantity of pain, yet " the pleasure must be considerably greater
in degree than the pain, if the two are so to counterbalance each
other in consciousness as to amount in combination to the state
of Indifference, and be preferred to this if the pleasure is a little
increased or the pain lessened". The true measure of the com-
parative value of pain and pleasure is the readiness with which
a pain is accepted for the sake of an antecedent or succeeding
pleasure, or a pleasure sacrificed to avoid such a pain; and even
so there will be all manner of individual differences. Yet the
mere possibility of such comparison implies an habitual endur-
ance of pain, for to the naive mind every pain, if it is anticipated
with any degree of accuracy, is absolutely great; or if often the
opposite seems to be the case, this is due to the careless disre-
gard of pain and determined - exaggeration of the value of
pleasure.
So much for pleasure and pain of the same kind : it is a still
more difficult matter to furnish a standard of comparison of
sensual pleasures or pains with mental pains or pleasures. For
here the estimate will vary even more witli differences of
character and intelligence. We are not surprised to find Mr.
Sully at variance with pessimists on this head also. He
acknowledges its difficulty, but hopes to get over it thus:—
" The simplest method is to make the antagonistic feelings
G •
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simultaneous. In this case it will be found that when they are
of equal intensity, they tend to neutralise one another, that is,
to produce a resultant state of feeling which has a zero-value."
Probatum estl It is a pity Mr. Sully does not deal in concrete
examples, else we should have liked an illustration.
If, again, we turn from pain and pleasure to their causes, we
shall find, as a general rule, that the natural and artificial
circumstances that are productive of pain are present every-
where and at all times, while those productive of an over-
balancing pleasure are limited and difficult of attainment j
unless indeed we are content to regard the mere painless modi-
fications of organic sensation as pleasures, as Mr. Sully does
with the visual impressions of form and colour. As for ennui,
on which Schopenhauer kid so much stress as the foe of human
well-being, Mr. Sully regards it as only " the penalty inflicted
on us for the non-fulfilment of some normal function, or the
reminder which is given us by the natural impulse of an organ
to discharge its recruited store of energy ". Now certainly ennui
is not in the common sense of the word an external evil, like
poverty or sickness ; but the circumstances that prevent us from
actually removing this removable evil are very often either
social or political ones, or are material organic conditions of our
own body which are outside the mind of the individual Many
evils might be annihilated, if we so willed with all our power;
unfortunately it only too often happens that we cannot will
that which is reasonable and, if not positively pleasurable, at
least painless. This troublesome question of the Nicht-wollen-
konnen will, however, meet us again. Meanwhile, let us turn to
Mr. Sully's criticism of Hartmann's a posteriori proof.
First of all, we are told that Hartmann himself " cuts off the
surest avenue to the facts " by rejecting " individual testimony
as an untrustworthy source of information on the subject," men
being disposed " to magnify the value of life through the very
action of unconscious will". Mr. Sully here misunderstands
Hartmann. The latter simply warns us against a false estimate
of the past life, past pains being so readily underrated because
they are past; whilst the passing pleasure is greatly magnified.
We see this happy gift of the human mind well displayed in the
frequent talk of aged people about " the good old times". If it
were possible to examine hourly a large number of men as to
their actual general feeling during a long time, and to put on
record the result, Hartmann would have no objection; but the
result would be, very different from that yielded by the
beautified notes of memory. It is only in this sense that
Hartmann attaches a superior value to objective testimony—not
from any disposition to make light of the individual's experience.
6 *
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Hartmann's view of the various circumstances of life does not
commend itself to Mr. Sully. He gives the list: (1) Health,
youth, liberty and material sufficiency; (2) Hunger ahd love;
(3) Pity, friendship and family happiness, (4) Pride, ambition
and desire for dominion; (5) Eeligious edification; (6) Immoral-
ity ; (7) Enjoyment of science and art; (8) Sleeping and
dreaming; (9) Pursuit of wealth; (10) Envy, vexation, &c.;
(11) Hope; and then exclaims, What a classification! But,
though the reader may expect it, he does not offer a better one.
It was, in truth, no part of Hartmann's intention to review all
the internal and external circumstances and conditions of life
that result in feeling. He held that an h priori proof, based on
that of Schopenhauer, but modified at some pointe, was quite
sufficient for his purpose. Having adopted the inductive method,
however, he felt that some amount of d posteriori proof was
necessary, and so he dipped into the abundant materials at his com-
mand, in a way indeed that may seem superficial to the hypercriti-
cal. Mr. Sully especially objects to Hartmann's comprehensive
treatment of labour, and to the omission of " motor activity,"
" genuine humour," and " the daily fulfilments of obligation of
all worthy citizens " as sources of happiness " both to the agent
and to others ". But, when Hartmann says that labour generally
brings more pain than pleasure, he understands labour as such
and apart from the aims whose attainment, or even the mere
hope of whose attainment, is or may be pleasurable. When
Mr. Sully speaks of labour as a source of happiness, ho means
the aim arrived at. When a workman enjoys his labour, it is
the thought that the produce of his toil will protect himself and
his family from want, with the hope that a time may come when
he may live without this labour, that is the real source of
his enjoyment. It will also satisfy his ambition to see his
handiwork sought for and acknowledged, while, if his work
is such as to admit of the display of inventive fancy, " the
interest of pursuit" (as Mr. Sully rightly suggests) will be
satisfied as he realises the ideas of beauty or utility in his works.
Work, however, as mere bodily activity, is hardly a source of
pleasure. If the physical condition is good, the pleasurable
feeling of health is not readily disturbed by it, though even here
fatigue is apt to set in towards evening, while in the case of the
elderly, the weak, or the sensitive, the fatigue may even extend
itself to the first working hours of the succeeding day. So to
the professional man and the man of business the labour of each
day is pleasurable chiefly as satisfying their desire for wealth,
self-respect, ambition, and vanity, or the loftier sentiments of
patriotism, humanity, and love to their fellow-creatures. The
case of the agricultural labourer or the factory hand is somewhat
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different; the pleasure of their daily work being limited to
that of winning their daily bread, or, at the best, satisfying their
self-respect and vanity. I t is only in the field of the fine arts
and sciences, and not always even there, that we find, as
Hartmann himself is careful to admit, work as such to be a
pleasure. As for that which Mr. Sully sets down as the most
important ingredient of happiness, namely, " what is known as
mental tone or the underlying sense of well-being," this
ought clearly to be reckoned under the head of health, which
stands first in Hartmann's classification. Health and the
accompanying feeling of well-being are simply conditions
that ought to be, life being presupposed as necessary, and in
general we do not think anything about them until we are
deprived of them. Even where they may be deemed as positive
pleasures, as in the aimless gambols of children and young
animals generally, there is mixed up with them another motive
to pleasure, namely, the play of merry fancies, expressed by
inarticulate sounds, or movements of the countenance. The
equilibrium, however, so essential to well-being is easily
disturbed, so that by the time the juvenile stage is past a
feeling of lassitude and heaviness, a residuum of pain in all the
organs except those of the special senses, is nearly always
present, though in so slight a form in the so-called healthful
state as to be covered by the manifold impressions of the outer
world, and to emerge into consciousness only during moments of
reflection and solitude.
It is another mistake of Mr. Sully's to suppose that muscular
exercise is the source of pleasure in the arduous sports of boys,
or in the chase and long pedestrian rambles of grown men. In
the case of the former it is the social impulse and the desire of
showing strength and adroitness that give to their games their
chief stimulus and satisfaction. In pedestrian rambles, again,
the pleasure does not lie in the mere act of transferring the
•weight of the body from one foot to the other throughout a
certain space of time, a • pleasure which might equally be
enjoyed by the recruit in the drill-yard, or the prisoner at the
treadmill The pleasure comes from the change which rambling
brings to sedentary people, living in towns: the farm-servant,
who daily walks behind the plough, finds his pleasure rather in
rest or in simple rural games.
As for humour and laughter, no one, certainly no German
pessimist, will doubt the value of the power " to transform all
the lighter evils of existence into sources of an after-gaiety ".
Genuine humour, indeed, is bound up in an especial manner
with pessimism, the object of laughter being generally something
that ought not to he. Throughout the whole range, from the
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harmless merry laugh to the scornful laugh of despair, we find
the same cause—the incongruity of a certain reality with the
representation or idea which we or others have of i t And,
though it is pleasant to laugh, we generally laugh at somebody's
cost, and feel that as pleasure which gives pain to another. If
laughter takes its motive from poetry, it falls within the domain
of art; and a philosopher with Hartmann's artistic gifts is little
likely to undervalue whatever thereto belongs. He only draws
the limits of the fine arts more strictly than Mr. Sully does,
banishing from their sanctuary those feelings of vanity, ambition,
curiosity, love of the adventurous, &c., &c., which are sometimes
imported into them. Mr. Sully has nothing to say about Hart-
mann's other divisions of hunger and love, of pity and family
happiness; the need of concrete treatment becomes too pressing
for him there. He censures Hartmann's examination of grief
and vanity, and with the remark that " the reader is by this
time, perhaps, pretty well convinced of the utterly flimsy and
meretricious character of Hartmann's examination of human
life," he passes on to consider the conditions of happinass in the
future.
Mr. Sully finds that, in spite of all the efforts of philosophers
from Aristotle to H. Spencer, " a systematic science of hedonics
has, as yet, no existence," and he aims at supplying the want by
" a truly scientific attempt to define happiness and its conditions,
and to determine whether the average external circumstances of
human life realise these conditions" (p. 263).1 Now at first
sight it does certainly seem easier to determine whether a person
is happy than to say whether in the same person's life pleasure
has predominated over pain; not because happiness is simply " a
peculiar compound of pleasure " (p. 279), but because happiness
may include a certain amount of pain, without ceasing to be
counted as happiness. According to Mr. Sully, " a wise man "
will Tiot aim at single pleasures, but at those fixed and
permanent relations of life which are ever sources of pleasure
and safeguards against pain, and which, from being the
1
 Let us note, in passing, one piece of inconsistency. When criticising the
theory of Schopenhauer and Hartmann that pleasure and pain are the
contentment or non-contentment of an act of will, Mr. Sully, it will be
remembered, advised his reader (p. 221) to consult any respectable text-book
in psychology, to learn that this theory is fallacious, and that pleasure and
pain '• ariseJrrom certain modes of bodily and mental activity, which are
variousiy defined as those which promote or hinder normal function" &c
On p. 272, however, he has changed his mind, and points oat how
inadequate this doctrine is to explain the facts of feeling. There is good
ground for the hesitation, but Mr. Sully should have remembered this when
he previously opposed a theory which not only recognises the truth of the
other doctrine within certain limits, but supplies its deficiencies.
6
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originators of happiness, come to be identified with it Surveying
his mental and physical faculties, he will strive to gain wealth
and riches ; for the satisfaction of his inner life he will surround
himself with friendship and love; and with works of charity—
so far as they do not disturb his personal comfort—he will
gratify his sense of pity. He will seek to counteract the bad
influences of weather and climate by hardening and training his
body, and enlarge his ability to enjoy mental pleasures by the
acquisition of knowledge, which extends his mental horizon and
improves his artistic skill. He will render his mental life, the
sphere of sensations, thoughts and fancies, happy by the power
of conscious volition, being careful to exclude all painful and sad
representations, whether recollections or anticipations, and to
cultivate sweet memories and hopes of a future more and more
bright. Nor is it merely the attainment of these ends that is to
be called happiness: the very act of striving after them is a
source of felicity, since all (?) the varied activities of self-culture
and bodily training are pleasurable. Thus, " when all the worst
evils of life, such as sickness, bereavement, &c, are averted—when
the conditions of large schemes of agreeable activity are present,
when the person concerned manifests an habitual pleasurable
interest in the events of the world which immediately surrounds
him, and when the whole key of life is that of quiet, unfaltering
devotion to large, inspiring and yet rational ends, we may be
said to have a fairly unambiguous presentation of human
happiness". " Observing such a type of existence, we take
upon ourselves to assure the person that he is and must (1)
be happy at moments when he is disposed to doubt the fact."
" We have the fact that happiness has been and is now being
realised. By this fact alone the fundamental idea of modern
pessimism is amply refuted."
So far Mr. Sully, to whom we would say in reply: The fact
that there are persons, and will be, at least as long as the
development of our earth goes on undisturbed, whose life is to be
declared a happy one, is not denied by pessimism. But the
question with the pessimist is: (1) Has such a happy life really
a higher value than pleasureless, but also painless, non-
existence ? and: (2) If happy life really is preferable to
non-existence, what is the proportion of this self-justified
existence to that which we may call unjustified, as not including
a greater amount of pleasure than of pain ? To the philosopher,
existence is not more reasonable, has no higher value, than
non-existence; existence can become superior to non-existence
only by its content Mr. Sully everywhere conceives life as
something that ought to be. This no doubt it is to the simple
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unreflective mind, from the fact of its being willed. But the
point to be settled is, whether this willing ia justifiable.
Mr. Sully makes the victory for optimism too easy when he
claims the simple normal action of the senses as positive
pleasure, and asserts that labour as such brings more pleasure
than pain. Self-culture and mental improvement likewise are
regarded by him as in themselves pleasurable. And, no doubt,
in many cases the victory our reason gains over our instincts or
over our bad impulses and habits, is accompanied by a pleasurable
feeling of satisfaction; but in other cases the suppression of
impulses condemned by reason is so painful that the succeeding
pleasure would be no equivalent for it, if the future consequences
were not taken into account. Besides, reason does not always
get the victory, having often to be contented with such gains as
only vanity can find satisfactory. Notwithstanding this, Mr.
Sully conceives the way to happiness as a state of happiness
itself, though he has to admit (p. 349) " that the quality of the
happiness reached by most of those who are undoubtedly worthy
to be called in a sense happy is anything but high if measured
by an ideal standard ". The question, then, as to what chance
the majority have of securing this modest happiness becomes the
more pressing. Mr. Sully allows further that " there are many
persons who cannot, by any stretch of probability, be pronounced
happy," the fact of suicide, of struggle with want and diificulty,
and of sickness everywhere, sufficiently proving this. As one of
the hindrances to happiness, he mentions the " gloomy tempera-
ment which seems to incapacitate one for accepting any of the
cheering gifts of life," and adds, "oftener it is a weakness of
active impulse and of will which shuts the person out from all
those fields of interesting occupation which are the sole guarantee
of an enduring happiness ". Thus millions of men never have
the opportunity of tracing a reasonable plan of happiness, though
their heart craves intensely for it; and they struggle painfully
to seize it by single unsystematic, and therefore useless, efforts.
Now to us it seems quite as great a misfortune to miss the path
to happiness, as to have no path at alL Not only are there
many who refuse to see the way to happiness, there are also
many who will their own misery and with full consciousness
tread the path to unhappiness. And what more tragical fate
than to be forced by one's inmost nature to struggle for that
which to the straggler brings nothing but pain and destruction 1
Mr. Sully takes too superficial a view of the doctrine of
determinism when he says it merely declares " that men will not
aim at a thing till they feel the appropriate motives—in other
words, till they begin to wish to possess it". For when the way
which leads to happiness is clearly known, how many obstacles
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have to be overcome, how many enemies conquered, before the
goal is reached 1 Even the.mere protection against want is not
so light a thing as Mr. Sully seems to think. Those who suffer
from hunger and cold in our large towns, and the starving
thousands of India, are they all people who did not will to
work ? Is it the case that the man, whose deepest feelings of
love, friendship and trust in mankind are wounded, can seek and
find satisfaction and happiness in other directions (p. 353) ? Is
sickness, whether of ourselves or those we love, less painful
because, as " wise men," we are sure that under given
circumstances a certain thing may or must happen ? Are " the
rough street Arab " and " the ragged urchin " (p. 351) really less
to be pitied, because in moments, when the stomach dees not
rebel, the busy world around them makes them forget their
miserable condition and the fact that within six hours they will
be hungry without the means to satisfy their hunger ? As
regards death, Mr. Sully holds that, so far from being considered
an evil, pessimism should laud it as the saviour from life's
misery; while the consciousness of the shortness of life and of
the certainty of death, instead of making life less valuable, should
really enhance its pleasure, as long as it lasts. To the pessimist,
who has learnt to look upon life from a philosophical point of
view, his own death is indeed no evil (we say nothing here of
the manner of death); the summons to quit the ranks of the
great army of sufferers is welcome, if only it does not bring
too great sorrow to others. The death of those we love is,
however, at all times an evil, even when we comfort ourselves
with the thought that they are now safe from fate's cruel blows,
nor can any pessimistic phrases make it otherwise; while to
the optimist, death is an evil tar ii-ovvv, whose very thought is
the destroyer of every joy. The frivolous and stupid may.
succeed in forgetting it, but never the " wise man," in face of
the thousandfold reminders that surround him.
Turning next to the question of future progress, it is Mr.
Sully's opinion that this " is a much more definite and tractable
problem than that of the relative amount of happiness and
misery co-existing now or at any past period in the world's
history ". And " if progress makes for an increase of happiness,
it matters but little what are the exact proportions of joy or
sorrow in the world at this fleeting point of time. Provided only
happiness be shown to be possible under certain conditions, the
demonstration that the onward movement of things tends,
however slowly, to the fuller realisation of these conditions
suffices to redeem the world as a whole from the damning
charge of the pessimist" This, however, can only be admitted,
if it be proved, first, that the peculiar conglomerate of feeling
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which Mr. Sully calls happiness, seems to an intellectual mind
really preferable to the insensible state of non-existence; and,
secondly, that what we call progress really acts in the supposed
direction. But this Mr. Sully has not succeeded in proving.
What makes his " wise man " an especially happy man is his
bondage to illusions, his light-mindedness, which in spite of all
present disappointments lulls him again and again in the
flattering hopes of a better future, and his never-ceasing impulse
to action, which prevents him from self-reflection. But if the
man in question is really a wise man, sooner or later the moment
of disillusion will come, and it will then be of no use to assure
him, as Mr. Sully does, that he is and must be happy. To meet
this contingency, Mr. Sully can only suggest a sustained faith in?
a happier world to come, or, failing that, at least in a happier
future of posterity. It is this future that we will now for a
little consider.
Historical progress is but one aspect of progress in nature
generally. The idea of evolution, long since adopted in.
philosophy, has become familiar in natural science, especially
through the labours of Mr. Darwin and his theory of natural
selection. It is not for us here to judge how far this theory, as
a mere mechanical principle, is able to account for the origin of
species. Suffice it to say that modern philosophy, with
Hartmann at its head, acknowledges the fact of the progressive
influence of natural selection Now in man evolution seems to
be limited to a higher development of the brain and a finer
construction of the nervous system. This improvement is the
correlative of a higher intellect, a superior mind, which is the
true mainspring of historical progress. Were history determined
by the natural passions only, there would be nothing new under
the sun; all progress depends on an increase in intelligence,
producing new motives to which the lower passions attach
themselves. It is not, however, the case, as Mr. Sully seems to
think, that the operation of natural selection within the mental
sphere tends to make the process of evolution at all less crueL
When the earliest prehistoric races overcame their animal
kindred, from which as yet they differed but little, by greater
versatility and shrewdness, or when they fought among
themselves with teeth and fists, the pain of defeat in such rude
struggles was no greater than now when we fight with lead and
iron or the arts of diplomacy, or when by superior industry one
nation compasses the ruin of another. The extinction of one
species by another more prolific does not seem to have been
attended by more suffering than is involved in the rivalry of
races, even though the doomed race is allowed slowly to starve
according to peaceful treaty and amid assurances of the kindest
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regard for its true welfare. Such things •will continue as long
as the evolution of nature and mind goes on. The tearing teeth
give way to the persuasive tongue and the skilful pen; the bare
fist and the stone-weapon are replaced by gun and rifle, and
these in their turn may give place to the votes of an international
congress. But in every case those who succumb must suffer,
though the pain may be transferred almost entirely from the
physical to the mental sphere. Individuals or races are
evermore acquiring a predominant intellectual influence over
others, and a two-fold suffering is the natural result. The
exercise of power is repressed in the superior few by the
multitude of inferiors, while these find it troublesome and
dangerous. Thus both sides are supplied with motives for a
struggle, which is none the less a real Btruggle for existence,
because its objects are ideas. The sympathy and benevolence
referred to by Mr. Sully (p. 387) cannot and will not prevent
this struggle; at the best they will only serve to heal the
wounds which it has caused. All that humanity joined to
prudence can do, is to alleviate and limit existing evils; and it
is only when benevolence has ceased, because there is no sphere
for its activity, that we can say that a positive step has been
taken towards general happiness. According to Hartmann, the
action even of the best form of government is but of a negative
character. Mr. Sully, on his side, would credit the state of
the future with unlimited powers, including even the checking
of over-population. Now many states have indeed tried to
restrain pauperism by putting obstacles in the way of matri-
mony, but the result has always been the same—the multipli-
cation of illegitimate births and prostitution. Or, if men should
become so prudent as to restrain their sexual impulses from a
regard to their own comfort, and from pity for the generations to
come, then the process of training for such wisdom would
certainly be a severe one, and what would be gained in ease from
family cares would be dearly paid for by the pain resulting from
the suppression of instinct. While, if the very instinct of
generation could by a " scientific mind " be supposed eradicated,
who can appreciate the effect upon the relation of the sexes—a
relation from whose soil have sprung the most venomous thorns
but also the sweetest blossoms of happiness, and which has
supplied the most stirring motives to human activity ?
No doubt, knowledge is expanding in all directions, and with
the increase of knowledge of nature there is an increase of our
power over it. But hitherto all positive increase of general
wealth has had the character of a robbing of nature, and a time
will come when the productiveness of the whole earth can no
more be increased. Nevertheless, pessimists do not deny that
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increase of knowledge, directly as well as indirectly, tends to
lessen and even remove many evils, and Hartmann, in particular,
joins with his pessimism a political and social optimism' that
seems quite beyond the comprehension of Mr. Sully. It is
generally admitted that epidemics may be prevented, or, where
they already exist, may be confined within narrower limits by a
more rational sanitary policy and improved medical art, while
many diseases may be made wholly to disappear by proper
f thysical training and the discovery of new remedies. Yet asong as the doom of death lasts, sickness and infirmity with its
attendant sufferings will go before. Hartmann does not question
the progress of the medical art, but oaly doubts whether it can
keep up with the rapid increase of the more complex nervous
diseases, and of that sensibility which causes slight disturbances
of the normal functions to be more acutely felt than were
greater disturbances in the earlier stages of man's existence,
in consequence of the finer nervous organisation which is the
condition of higher intelligence.
The future will doubtless heal many wounds which now seem
incurable. Even the social question will some day find a
solution, though no one dare say whether it will be by gentle or
by violent means. But the great sources of suffering will still
abide in the future, for the reason that they spring from the
very conditions of life. In fact, just in proportion as the
different evils arising from passing social and political conditions
are found to vanish, will the fact become more and more evident
that life itself is the worst foe of happiness. Even if
Mr. Sully had succeeded in proving that in the far-off future
those existences that we call happy will become the majority,
the fundamental idea of pessimism would still be far from being
refuted. Should it be the doom of organic creation to perish by
a general refrigeration, surely the sum total of pain arising from
the pressure of more and more unfavourable climatic conditions
on the animal and vegetable kingdoms would be infinitely
greater than during the period of improving conditions; for with
every backward movement a developed consciousness would
have to be repressed. And, even if the cooling of our globe
were to cease at the stage most favourable to human life and
progress, the existence of a happy race during an indefinite
future would tell against pessimism only on the supposition that
the happy humanity of the future and the suffering humanity of'
the past and the present are one and the same. This is the idea
iuvolved in the ' panlogism' or ' panthelism' of Hartmann, but
has no place of right in the materialistic automatism and
•will-dualism of Mr. Sully. If there is no absolute unconscious
spirit as the entity common to all the separate conscious minds,
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the distant future is absolutely nothing to me of the present; it
is only what I myself suffer or enjoy that can incline me to
pessimism or optimism. After me may come the deluge or the
mfllenium, but it is a matter of indifference to me, if my Ego is a
mere cerebral phenomenon, the product of an aggregation of mere
material atoms.
We will not follow Mr. Sully in his inquiry into the
internal and external sources of pessimism and the causes of
its rapid dissemination, but only note that he has too
intelligent and keen an eye for natural, political and social
shortcomings to throw himself unreservedly into the arms of
optimism. He considers that, according to the side from which
they are regarded, the facts may land us either in optimism or
pessimism. In this we agree with him, but not when he goes
on to say that the main source of pessimism is an abnormal
sensitiveness to pain, and that pessimism itself is to be regarded
in a large measure as a pathological phenomenon, which will
cease to exist when the medical science of the future shall succeed
in overcoming the peculiarities of temperament in which it is
rooted (p. 444). With certain limitations this may be true in
cases of unreasoned pessimism—Wdtschmerz, but not of philoso-
phical pessimism, which, uninfluenced by subjective feelings,
rests exclusively on objective observation, and counts individual
sensation as an object among other objects. Whatever can in
this way be alleged against pessimism, can with equal force be
alleged against optimism, and there is no reason why defects of
temperament should be easier to eliminate in the one case than
in the other. Nor is the attempt to hold the balance between
optimism and pessimism that most worthy of " the man of philo-
sophic mind " (p. 463); it should rather be to find the synthesis
of both. To the eye of cool reason the world seems as good as
possible because it is a real logical process; in the eudaemonistic
point of view, it is worse than no world, because the path whereon
the logos strides from victory to victory is a path of suffering to
the creature.
So far as the "how" and the "what" of the world is
concerned, Mr. Sull/s own " meliorism " does not differ from
Hartmann's social and political optimism; but if meliorism
includes the hope that the future will justify the fact that a
world exists, it merely illustrates what Hartmann calls " the
third stage of illusion".
We may finally remark, in thus closing our long criticism of a
"criticism," thatit is not because they have to pay high taxes, or to
do military service for their country, nor yet from any humiliating
consciousness of the superiority of French civilisation and
luxury, that BO many Germans confess to Hartmann's pessimism;
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but because a time of material prosperity and of fulfilment of
national hopes and wishes is a fit time to show how small an
influence a little more or a little less of luck in external
conditions can have on the value of life. And, if we have suc-
ceeded in convincing some readers that German pessimism has
not been quite annihilated by Mr. Sully, and that it might still
be worth their while to study its true meaning in the works of
Schopenhauer and Hartmann, our labour has not been in vain.
0. PLUMACHEB.
NOTE.—It is impossible to explain such remarks as those which Mr.
Sully has thought fit to make on Hartmann's style and method at pp.
464-7, except on the assumption that he has a rooted prej adice against the
great German thinker. They could hardly have been penned if Hart-
mann's works had already (by translation) become generally known. In
dealing with the opponents of Hartmann, his taste in the matter of style is
somewhat less delicate, else he would hardly call the flat witticisms of J.
C. Fischer "pleasantly satirical," and find the attack of a certain Dr.
Stiebeling "rather effective" (p. 204). He does indeed speak of an
anonymous work, Bat Unbewustte vom Standjninkt der Phyiiologit und
Desetndemtheorie (1872), as " a much more thoughtful demonstration of
the untenability of Hartmann's biological assumptions "; but he evidently
little suspected what was to be revealed in a second edition (1877). that this
work, whose truly scientific character was fully recognised in Germany,
was the production of none other than Hartmann himself ! Hartmann has
thus given unmistakeable proof of being no mere layman in natural science;
and, in particular, he has shown that it was from no ignorance of what
the mechanical principle of Darwinism is able to explain that he felt himself
bound to reject it in part, and to declare the necessity of adopting instead
a spiritualistic teleological principle, to which the other is but as means to
end.
VL—PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNITED STATES.
THEBE are nearly 300 non-Catholic colleges in the United
States, most of them chartered by the legislatures of their
respective states, and conferring the degree of A.B. upon their
students at the end of a four years' course, and A.M.
three years after graduation. In nearly all these institutions
certain studies, sesthetical, logical, historical, most commonly
ethical, most rarely psychological, are roughly classed as
philosophy and taught during the last year almost invariably
by the president The methods of instruction and examination
are so varied that it is impossible in the space at our disposal
to report in detail upon the nature and value of the work
done in these institutions. More than 200 of them are
strictly denominational, and the instruction given in philosophy
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